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The ‘Futures’ of Queer Children and the
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KEVIN MCDONOUGH
This paper focuses on an especially urgent challenge to the
legitimacy of the common school ideal—a challenge that has
hardly been addressed within contemporary debates within
liberal philosophy of education. The challenge arises from
claims to accommodation by queer people and queer
communities—claims that are based on notions of queerness
and queer identity that are seriously underrepresented within
contemporary liberal political and educational theory. The
paper articulates a liberal view of personal autonomy that is
constituted by a conception of practical reasoning rooted in
thick communal experiences. It is argued that common schools
concerned with equal concern for the autonomy of all children
must attend to the specific communal requirements needed to
developing the autonomous practical reasoning of queer
children—requirements for what is termed a sense of
‘futurity’. Five practical recommendations for common
schools are briefly outlined. The paper concludes with some
reflections on the divergent and convergent interests of queer
theory and liberalism, and considers some possibilities for a
partial reconciliation of the two theoretical perspectives.
At the most basic level, a ‘common school’ can be regarded as a school
which is open to, and intended for, all students within a given society
regardless of their specific differentiating characteristics (Terence
McLaughlin, 2003, p. 122).
INTRODUCTION
A fundamental test of the common school’s legitimacy is this: Can the
common school ideal, and the liberal political principles that underwrite it,
coherently accommodate reasonable and legitimate forms of moral and
cultural diversity, especially those forms that have historically been
marginalised, discriminated against or excluded? In this paper, I focus on
an especially urgent challenge to the legitimacy of the common school
ideal—one that has hardly been addressed within contemporary debates
within liberal philosophy of education.1 This challenge arises from claims
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to accommodation by queer people and queer communities—claims that
are based on notions of queerness and queer identity that are seriously
underrepresented within contemporary liberal political and educational
theory. At its simplest, the question I wish to address is how liberal
principles that underwrite the common school ideal are capable, if they are
capable at all, of providing a coherent ethical and educational basis for
accommodating and recognising queer people and queer identities.
QUEER THEORY MEETS LIBERALISM: FUTURITY, AUTONOMY AND
FLOURISHING
The view that liberal theory and liberal educational institutions cannot
adequately accommodate the legitimate claims of queer children (and
adults) has recently been advanced by queer theorists who are beginning
to critically engage with the arguments of ‘mainstream’ liberal
philosophers of education. A good example of the willingness on the
part of queer theorists to engage critically with liberal arguments can be
found in recent articles by Cris Mayo (2006a, 2006b), and for that reason
her work provides the primary reference point in queer theory for my
arguments in this paper.
Perhaps Mayo’s deepest concern is that liberalism, and the educational
institutions it sponsors, have thus far failed to address, and perhaps cannot
address, the fact that ‘queer children are denied a sense of futurity’ in
liberal societies and in public schools (Mayo, 2006a, p. 473). As Mayo
puts it, ‘For a philosophy and political practice dedicated to interrogating
traditions and opening possibilities for innovation, liberalism has been
suspiciously unwilling to extend its analysis to sexual freedom, its
embrace of autonomy to queer critique, its sense of progression toward
new possibilities to queer futurities’ (p. 471).
In developing a liberal response to queer theory’s concerns, I follow
Mayo’s usage of the terms ‘queer’, ‘queer identity’ and ‘queer children’.
According to Mayo, ‘one reason theorists have turned to using the concept
‘‘queer’’ is to underline the uncertainty and shifts in sexual identities,
practices, and communities’ that queerness raises for queer people and
communities, and for the wider population (p. 469). A number of
complexities are worth attending to here. First, ‘queerness’ refers to more
than a person’s sexual desire or preferred sexual behaviour. For example,
it implies a certain orientation to the ways in which one’s gay, lesbian,
bisexual or transgendered identity unsettles and ‘disrupts’ dominant
heterosexual norms, roles, laws and communities. Thus, there is an overtly
political element to the term that is lacking or less prominent in terms like
‘homosexual’ or ‘sexual orientation’. This political element is explicitly
oppositional with respect to the dominance and exclusiveness of
heterosexual norms and assumptions in law, policy and public institutions.
The term ‘queer identity’ also suggests an affiliation with self-identified
queer communities. Not all homosexual people will accept queer
affiliations in this sense, though queer theorists will argue that queerness
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still applies in a more limited sense to all gay, lesbian, bisexual and
transgendered people, even in the absence of felt affiliation. For example,
some people with homosexual desires may live their lives in heterosexual
marriages. And some homosexual couples will live according to roles and
values that seamlessly merge with those of many heterosexual families;
and they may have little interest in highlighting or drawing attention to the
main difference between them and their heterosexual neighbours—the fact
that both partners in the relationship share the same gender. Nevertheless,
as queer theorists will point out, that difference may not be missed and
may not be accepted by the heterosexual neighbours and citizens with
whom gay and lesbian couples must share a society and polis; and the laws
and political policies of the liberal state may not include them as equal
citizens in many respects. In this way, the concept of ‘queerness’ captures
a sort of social ‘rupture’ that is present even when homosexuals reject the
queer identity label.
Finally, and most importantly, the term ‘queer children’ refers to children
whose sexual identity is not simply ‘in formation’ as are the sexual
identities of all children, but children whose identities depend upon social
categories that are as yet not widely understood or recognised, and often are
excluded by liberal law, or within public political and social discourses
within liberal societies. Because these identities are poorly understood,
because they are viewed with considerable ‘animus’ by heterosexual
citizens, and because their sexual differences are not assigned equal value
within liberal law and politics, Mayo argues that queer children are ‘barely
recognizable’, particularly in public schools (p. 469).
I am particularly concerned with issues having to do with the
‘recognition’ and accommodation of queer children in common schools.
However, it might seem that the preceding discussion of queerness makes
the notion of ‘queer children’ and their recognition in schools a problematic
one. If children’s identities are still developing into forms that are poorly
understood, in part because those forms are still emerging and changing,
then it might seem premature to speak of the need to support and recognise
those identities in schools. For one thing, it is not clear what is being
supported and recognised; and as such it may be that the intention to
‘recognise’ and ‘support’ gets distorted into forms that are both anti-liberal
and against the best interests of queer children. For example, if identities are
poorly understood, then the danger may arise that schools will socialise
children into pre-existing moulds based on educators’ distorted and
inauthentic conception of what a queer identity should be, rather than
leaving children free to choose and endorse their own conceptions of
queerness through an examination of how queer people actually might live
worthwhile lives.2 In addition to impeding children’s autonomy, this
educational approach would constitute a damaging form of identity
misrecognition, since it would change and distort queer identities (perhaps
unintentionally), rather than recognise them.
Here I want to stress two points. First, the demand for queer recognition
need not assume that we know beforehand precisely what forms of queer
social identity forms are being recognised; nor does it require that we be
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able to identify exactly which children are ‘queer children’ and which
ones are not, so that we can on that basis ‘recognise’ them accordingly.
Rather, it assumes that some children will discover at some point in their
development—perhaps not until they are adults—that they cannot live
well as heterosexuals. Furthermore, it is precisely because we cannot pick
out beforehand which children these will be that all children require
exposure to alternative models of identity, including queer models, upon
which to base their developing individual sexual identities (for a
compatible view see, for example, Brighouse, 2000, pp. 74–5; Brighouse,
2006, pp. 17–18).
The second point I want to emphasise is that the demand for queer
recognition need not assume that the boundaries between queer children
and heterosexual or ‘straight’ children are crystal clear and absolutely
fixed. Again, the main assumption underlying the demand for queer
recognition in common schools is that some children will find that their
identities simply cannot ‘synch up’ comfortably with conceptions of good
living that heterosexuality provides. For these children, sexual identity
will not be a matter of choice, or it will be a matter of limited choice
because it will exclude heterosexual options while remaining open to a
variety of alternatives. But this is compatible with a wide range of
(necessarily speculative) views about the ultimate origins and sources of
sexuality and sexual difference. It may be, for example, that for many
children the discovery that their queer identity is not a matter of choice is a
complex matter of socialisation and genetic endowment. For others, the
question of whether to live as a heterosexual or as a homosexual or as a
bisexual person may seem more open-ended. It may also be that, for some,
heterosexuality and homosexuality are ‘phases’ through which one passes.
This is not objectionable speculation from the liberal point of view so long
as we acknowledge both possible tracks along which the ‘phase’ might
constitute a moment of progression. That is, it must be acknowledged that
one child might develop in such a way such that her heterosexuality is a
phase in an otherwise homosexual life; while a different child could
develop in such a way that homosexuality is a phase in a life whose future
is heterosexual (Reiss, 1997, p. 348).
The significance of these two points is this. Although we may lack
certainty about which children will turn out to be ‘queer’ and although
there may be differing views about how fixed (or fluid) we should interpret
sexual identities to be, some children will turn out to reject heterosexual
ways of life and heterosexual identities, and in some cases this will not be
a matter of choice at all; in other cases it will be a matter of choice only
among various non-heterosexual identities; in still other cases there may
be a choice to alter one’s sexuality in order to adjust it to new
circumstances and new self-knowledge. Thus, uncertainty and disagree-
ment about how to draw the line between queer and non-queer identities
does not obviate the need for an exploration of why and how liberal
common schools might accommodate queer identities. Such an elabora-
tion is needed in order to ensure that children have educational
opportunities that include the possibility of a ‘queer future’.
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LIBERAL AUTONOMY AND ‘FUTURITY’
What does all this have to do with liberal education and the recognition of
queerness in the common school? The connections to liberalism may
already seem quite clear, at least in outline—especially the connection to
liberal concerns about democratic citizenship and personal autonomy. But
does pursuing these educational aims require something that we might
want to call the ‘recognition’ of queerness and queer identities in common
schools? to address this question, I begin with John White’s recent
comments:
A core liberal value is personal autonomy. An autonomous person is one
who determines how he or she should live according to their own,
unpressured, picture of a worthwhile life. But autonomy on its own is not
enough. A tyrant might also value this, but only for himself, just as a
certain sort of elitist might think autonomy fine for the upper classes to
which she belongs, but not for the common people. A liberal makes no
such discriminations among persons: personal autonomy is a good
applicable to all. Equality of consideration is, therefore, a second core
liberal value (White, 2003, p. 147).
The connection White emphasises between autonomy and equal
consideration is crucially important, since it highlight’s liberalism’s concern
to extend autonomy to individuals from historically excluded and margin-
alised groups. Liberal schooling is, of course, seen as a vital instrument for
extending autonomy in this way. It follows from this claim that the
autonomy of queer children is as valuable and important a political and
educational concern of the liberal state as that of any other child. It also
follows that liberal education cannot legitimately ‘educate children away
from queer futures’ any more than it can educate children ‘away from
heterosexual futures’ (Mayo, 2006a, p. 473). These are matters for
autonomous choice, and liberal education must treat them as such.
EQUAL CONSIDERATION: WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
SPELUNKING AND QUEERNESS?
Why, though, does equal consideration of autonomy require explicit
recognition of queer identities? In order to autonomously choose a life as a
spelunker,3 centred on the goods and skills of spelunking, I need not have
been familiarised with the activity of spelunking itself until adulthood.
Certain cognitive and affective capacities developed as a child, in relation
to an examination of other ways of life may have prepared me sufficiently
to evaluate this and other ways of life, that I did not become familiar with
until after my schooling had ended. The question arises, then, why does
promoting the autonomy of queer children require that we familiarise
children with queer ways of life and ‘queer identities’ prior to adulthood?
Here I ask this question without considering the school’s role. What I
mean to ask, simply, is why we might think that children’s autonomy
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depends on their becoming familiar with specifically queer roles and queer
communities and queer identities? Why are not generic capacities for
critical thinking and sympathetic imagination for alternative ways of life
sufficient? The reason it is important to answer these questions is that if
the failure explicitly to expose children to queer ways of life does not
affect the development of their autonomy, then we have no reason to
suppose that a concern for children’s autonomy requires the school to
recognise queer identities. But if queer children’s autonomy does depend
on actual engagement with queer options, then there exists a compelling
prima facie reason for the common school to facilitate such engagement. I
shall argue that the compelling prima facie reason does exist, and that it
entails a form of ‘recognition’ for queerness in common schools.
Alasdair MacIntyre’s comments on how the ability to imagine different
futures is connected to the capacity for practical reasoning are extremely
helpful here. MacIntyre is interested in particular in understanding the
various dimensions of ‘the child’s transition from dependent infancy to the
agency of an independent practical reasoner’ (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 72).
One such dimension, he notes, is the acquisition of the ability to imagine
‘different possible futures for me’. The full passage in which this comment
occurs is worth quoting:
How we structure our understanding of the future depends in part of
course on the established use of clocks, calendars, and modes of
scheduling of the culture in which we find ourselves. But as a practical
reasoner I have to be able to imagine different possible futures for me, to
imagine myself moving forward from the starting point of the present in
different directions. For different or alternative futures present me with
different and alternative sets of goods to be achieved, with different
possible modes of flourishing. And it is important that I should be able to
envisage both nearer and more distant futures and to attach possibilities,
even if only in a rough and ready way, to the future results of acting in one
way rather than another. For this both knowledge and imagination are
necessary (MacIntyre, 1999, pp. 74–5).
MacIntyre here is writing in the context of a discussion of how disabled
children might be subjected to ‘too constrained and impoverished a view
of future possibilities’ (p. 75) in what might be called ‘able-normative’
societies.4 Importantly, according to MacIntyre’s account, the impover-
ishment of imagination about disabled children’s ‘future possibilities’ is
not primarily a characteristic of the disabled individual (though it
obviously affects the disabled more profoundly than it does the abled).
Rather, it is a characteristic primarily of ‘the groups of which [the disabled
child] is a member’. To illustrate: one example of the way in which able-
normativity exerts a withering pressure on the ‘imagined possible futures’
of disabled children lies in what Hans Reinders calls ‘the presumption of
suffering’ of the disabled and those who care for them (Reinders, 2000,
ch. 10). As MacIntyre notes, something like this presumption is often
attached to characteristics such as ‘blindness, deafness, deformed and
injured limbs, and the like . . .’; and because this presumption suffuses
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communal norms, institutions, modes of relationship, etc., it and other
similarly harmful presumptions ‘exclude the sufferer from more than a
very, very limited set of possibilities. And this has often been treated as if
it were a fact of nature’ (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 75).
What MacIntyre’s discussion highlights, most importantly, is how
communal attitudes, norms and relationships help to ‘structure our under-
standing of the future’ at the level of individual development, upbringing
and education. Furthermore, important elements of communal life that
structure the development (or lack of development) of skills of inde-
pendent practical reasoning are mutually reinforcing sets of rules (laws),
virtues and practices. Without sustained and engaged exposure to these
elements of a community in ‘good order’ then the capacities for
independent practical reasoning can develop only inadequately, in ways
that diminish our individual and communal ‘view of future possibilities’
(p. 85).
These reflections on the ways in which the agency of disabled people is
dependent on (in part) communally structured ‘visions of future
possibility’ apply similarly to the case of queer children. If the
communities of which children are a part (here I do not just mean those
children who turn out to be queer, but all children) fail to include
expansive visions of queer possibilities, then the ability of queer children
(i.e. those who turn out to be unable to live their lives as heterosexuals) to
develop into independent practical reasoners will be constrained to the
extent that they will be unable to link up their reasoning to realistic and
expansive ‘imagined futures’ involving valuable and worthwhile queer
roles, communities and identities. Relatedly, they will not be able acquire
sufficient knowledge of the goods those communities afford their
members, and they will be unable to achieve a sufficiently vivid sense
of the virtues, practices and rules that provide group members with a
meaningful understanding of what their respective intermediate and long-
term alternative future possibilities might consist in.
The problem in the case of queer children is not just that their
communities lack a sufficiently expansive range of queer futures. Rather,
the problem is also that those communities may actively to foreclose queer
possibilities as children’s capacities of independent practical reasoning are
developing. These forces of foreclosure are even more powerful in the
case of queer children (arguably) than they are in the case of disabled
children. And one reason for this has to do with the differences of family
relationship that structure queer children’s futures differently from those
of other children, including children with disabilities.
QUEER CHILDREN AND THE FAMILY
In societies where heterosexual roles and norms are dominant in politics,
law and civil society, numerous socially acceptable and approved
pathways for heterosexual identity development are available for children
to examine and choose from. Furthermore, families are likely to support
and encourage children’s access to and familiarity with at least some if not
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many of these different social contexts so as to increase their opportunities
and to expand their imaginative horizons. At the very least, they are not
likely to restrict children’s access to heterosexual roles and communities
simply because those roles are heterosexual ones. Furthermore, hetero-
sexual children can usually count on a good deal of parental love, support
and care as they grow up; or at least their sexuality does not usually
present the prospect of the parental withdrawal or rejection as it may for
queer children. At any rate, the development of a capacity for personal
autonomy and well-being is not typically threatened for heterosexual
children due to the lack of available or valuable heterosexual role models,
communities, etc., though the development of these same capacities may
be threatened for just these reasons in the case of queer children.
Queer roles and communities are also available within liberal civil
societies, and as such they are potentially accessible to queer children and
queer youth. But the availability and accessibility in this case is
comparatively thin and restricted, especially when it comes to children.
First, queer communities may be few and far between—in part because
those adult forms of community tend to be concentrated in certain areas of
large urban centres (Levy, 2005, p. 183). Furthermore, queer communities
are likely to be subject to strong social and parental disapproval; and thus
exposure and access to these communities for young people will often be
viewed as harmful and dangerous, rather than as providing a rich and
textured social fabric for positive identity formation. Finally, queer
children are more likely than heterosexual children to be members of
families that do not favour their sexual identity and that thus seek to
change it, impede it or at the very least neglect its development and
flourishing. Problematically, then, on the one hand, queer and ‘proto-queer’
children will often find that their emerging sense of personal identity fits
uncomfortably, if at all, into the socially accepted ‘heteronormative’
pathways. On the other hand, the adults who have the power over and
responsibility for queer children’s sense of future possibilities are unlikely
to facilitate access to queer communities that might support a more
expansive sense of future queer possibilities.
At the same time, the extra-familial communities of which queer
children are members—families, neighbourhoods, churches, local com-
munity organisations, etc.—will likely reinforce a diminished sense of
future queer possibilities, rather than expand them. This will not always be
due to ‘animus’ towards queerness or queer people. Rather, it may result
from the lack of fit between social categories available for identity
recognition, on the one hand, and queer children’s complex self-
understandings, on the other hand. Thus, for example, a child’s parents
may be scrupulously committed to liberal principles of non-discrimination
while also expressing disapproval and confusion at their son’s periodic and
(to the parents) unpredictable flirtations with cross-gender dressing. As this
example illustrates, heterosexual families and communities will often lack
concrete, phenomenological understandings of how people who identify
inconsistently or not at all with established gender categories negotiate their
complex self-understandings. As such, their child’s self-understanding is
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likely to exist in part in the interstices of his family’s or his local
community’s accepted social identity categories. And thus even the
sympathetic heterosexual family or community may be ill-equipped to
help a queer child make the transition from the confusions and dislocation
associated with interstitial self-understanding to socially accepted and
meaningful identity. Thus, queer children who grow up in heterosexual
families and communities will likely find themselves in social contexts
that provide too limited a set of experiences to ‘navigate the complexity
and possibility of language’, experience and meaning they need in order to
explore ‘future possibilities’ (Mayo, 2006b, p. 43). This also constitutes an
important difference between queer children and heterosexual children;
hetero-sexual children are far more likely to have substantial exposure to
caring communities and families that provide expansive and meaningful
visions of their future possibilities.
These complexities of sexuality can and do create considerable
confusion and distortion about queer sexual identities, both from the
perspective of queer children themselves and on the part of non-queer
people whose responses to and interpretations of queerness, or perhaps
absence of response to and lack of interpretation of queerness, play an
important role in the shaping of queer identities. These confusions are
likely to have harmful effects on queer children’s identity formation—
on their autonomous flourishing. Martha Nussbaum neatly summarises
the complex and various ways in which processes of misrecognition
and lack of recognition toward queer people can cause harm: ‘Like
E.M. Forster’s character Maurice, many gay and lesbian [and, Mayo
would add, bisexual and transgendered people] seem indistinguishable
from nongay people—or, rather, distinguishable only by the experience of
discovering that what they want is socially unacceptable’ (Nussbaum,
2000, p. 232).
Unlike that of heterosexual children, whether they come from religious
or non-religious families, the experience of growing up in a hetero-
normatively constituted society may be an experience of pervasive
hostility and harm. It may also be an experience of growing up in families
and communities that lack expansive possibilities for ‘queer futures’; and
it is likely to be an experience that insulates one from or bars access to
more friendly and hospitable queer communities and social contexts. But
if MacIntyre is right, as he surely is, that individual agency and flourishing
depend on ‘knowledge and imagination’ about one’s future possibilities
and that this must be developed through concrete, phenomenologically
rich encounters with real communities, stories and identities, then the
problems facing queer children seem especially severe. The fundamental
problem may not be that queer children have fewer opportunities than
heterosexual children to develop a sense of autonomous flourishing. The
problem may be that queer children’s education and upbringing provides
so little exposure to the material conditions of individual agency and
practical reasoning about future possibilities that queer lack any
significant opportunities for flourishing at all. (For a different but
compatible argument, see Brighouse, 2000, p. 73.) This point highlights
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the need for children to have access to actual queer communities and
raises the question of what role the common school might play.
Here we can return to the example of the hypothetical autonomous
spelunker that began this discussion. The autonomous adult can
presumably choose spelunking as a way of life, without having been
exposed to that way of life in his upbringing or education, because two
important conditions are met. First, spelunking is a way of life that is
available within a social sub-community whose practices, rules and virtues
are practised and taught in such a way that I can learn them if exposed to
them. Second, my upbringing and education as an independent practical
reasoner has not already foreclosed spelunking as an option for me by the
time I am exposed to it. That option is ‘open’ as a future possibility (in this
case, the very near future) because it is continuous with and unimpeded
by what I have learned as a developing independent practical reasoner
up until this point. My society is not pervasively and intensely ‘anti-
spelunking’, although spelunking is regarded by most members of my
community as an exotic and eccentric way of life. And the skills needed
for spelunking mesh rather smoothly with the norms, virtues and practices
that I have learned in prior stages of my education and development.
There are no serious tensions or conflicts, and numerous areas of
compatibility and mutual reinforcement between my past identity
incarnations (which were once future possibilities as well) and my current
‘possible future’—spelunking.
But for many queer children, neither of these conditions can be taken for
granted at the outset. And as a result, the task of choosing queer options as
adults is likely to be sharply discontinuous with their development as
‘practical reasoners’, rather than continuous as in the case of the
autonomous spelunker. The point I want to stress is just this. That the
‘transition from dependent infant to independent practical reasoner’ that
MacIntyre speaks of requires a certain sort of educational community—a
community that children lack in the home or in most locally available
groups. Furthermore, independent practical reasoning is constitutive of
autonomy. The capacity for autonomy, like the capacity for independent
practical reasoning, cannot be based on either wishful thinking based on
highly abstract fantasies, or by a restricted imagination based on a limited
range of options that excludes many worthwhile possibilities. As such,
queer children require exposure to queer communities that provide
expansive visions of future possibilities as queer people.
LIBERALISM, THE COMMON SCHOOL IDEAL AND QUEER FUTURES
In the preceding section I articulated and defended three interlocking
claims. First, the development of personal autonomy depends upon an
upbringing and education that attends to the conditions necessary for
developing and exercising certain capacities of practical reasoning.
Second, these capacities of practical reasoning are essential for children
to have a vision of possible ‘queer futures’. Third, developing these
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capacities of reasoning depends in part on children developing a
reasonably thick familiarity with and understanding of actual queer lives
and queer communities.
These conclusions suggest some relatively straightforward practical
recommendations for the recognition of queerness in the common school.
In this section, I would like to briefly address five areas of concern.
First, common schools would need to make serious and sustained
attempts to address issues of what seems to be pervasive and persistent
violence, bullying and other forms of harassment against queer children in
schools. In the US, schools such as the Harvey Milk School in New York
City have been established specifically for gay, lesbian and transgendered
kids. These schools are partially funded by public money; and the use of
public funds is justified in part because these schools are a response to the
widespread violence and emotional harm that queer children experience in
public schools, in their families and in the wider society (Dennis and
Harlow, 1986; see also Mayo, 2006a).5 As D.L. Dennis and R.E. Harlow
explain, the students in schools such as the Harvey Milk School have often
been subjected to violence at the hands of other students and teachers.
Furthermore, this abuse is sometimes tacitly endorsed by school adminis-
trators who refuse to extend protection to queer students even when they
become aware that abuse is occurring, and even when they are aware of
which specific individuals are committing the abuse (Dennis and Harlow,
1986, pp. 446–456). Mayo emphasises throughout her paper the multiple
and complex ways in which ‘animus’ against queers might manifest itself in
liberal societies and in common schools, and she emphasises the fact that
merely adopting official policies of anti-discrimination—for example,
speech codes or anti-bullying policies—does not sufficiently address the
ways in which discriminatory and violent treatment toward queer students
can persist in the presence of such policies, since teachers, administrators
and students often fail to recognise such treatment when it occurs; and they
may recognise it but nonetheless tolerate it or overlook it when queer
students are the target. Where deep-seated animus towards queerness exists,
individuals will find creative and sometimes hard-to-identify ways of
rationalising and obscuring officially prohibited discrimination and
violence. Certainly, ensuring the psychological, emotional and physical
well-being of children is a precondition of their developing capacities of
autonomous practical reasoning, if anything is.
A second area that requires attention is the curriculum. In order to
develop realistic and valuable conception of possible queer futures,
children would need detailed and rich examples of queer role models. This
might include narratives (historical and fictional) of gay, lesbian and
transgendered people that provide a sense of the fullness of their lives.
These stories would also need to be incorporated into the curriculum not
as tokenistic ‘special features’ that highlight the eccentricity or exotic
nature of queer lives and communities. They would need to be
incorporated seamlessly as part of children’s educational induction into
the complex and multi-faceted, cosmopolitan cultural context of liberal-
democratic societies. Narratives and other cultural products including
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queer elements would need to address issues not merely to do with the
‘different’ sexual behaviour and sexual desires of gay, lesbian and
transgendered people, but also concerning the ways in which their
queerness has affected the social, personal, economic and political
dimensions of their lives. Attention would need to be given to the ways in
which contemporary liberal societies have broached or failed to broach
issues of queer oppression and discrimination, and also the ways in which
anti-discriminatory legal and political policies address certain aspects of
inequality while leaving other aspects of social life unchanged, at least in
the short term, as it pertains to the construction and treatment of queer
people. It would also need to address the ways in which laws that
incorporate heterosexual norms affect both personal and political aspects
of life for queer individuals and queer communities.
A third important area of concern is teacher training and hiring
practices. Teachers in the common school would need to be knowledge-
able about queer life and also be disposed to treat the complex nature of
queerness (e.g., in its political, legal, social and personal dimensions)
both generously and critically. This is necessary in order to provide
children with a realistic picture of what possible queer lives might
involve. Relatedly, it is necessary for providing children with either an
excessively discouraging picture of the struggles against oppression that
such lives often entail, or an excessively unrealistic and fantastic picture
of the goods and values that can be derived from such a life. In order to
cultivate the capacity for personal autonomy rooted in concrete abilities
of practical reasoning, the aim should be to provide a richly concrete,
nuanced and detailed, future-oriented sense of what such lives involve.
In this way, attempts to attract queer teachers for teacher education
programmes, and for public schools, should be included as policy
priorities for the common school. And all teachers should be provided
with training that would equip them to undertake competently the tasks
outlined above.
Furthermore, and fourth, attention should be given to the fact that school
officials and school boards are not always, to say the least, supportive of
teachers like those described in the preceding paragraph (Reiss, 1997,
p. 350). And so in addition to broadly based, sometimes legally imposed,
policies of anti-discrimination based on ‘sexual orientation’, some
serious attempts must be made to ensure that official policies are applied
in such a fashion as to take account of the manner in which queer
children may be discriminated against in ‘hidden’ or at least ignored
ways within the textured, complex social life of school communities.
Here, MacIntyre’s point about the complex and mutually reinforcing
relationships of laws (or rules, such as speech codes and the like),
practices and virtues within communal life apply with some force to
school communities.
Fifth, and finally, attempts to address issues of recognition and
accommodation of queerness and queer identities must address in some
way the role that specifically queer communities might play in children’s
education. As Mayo puts it, ‘because liberal theorists consider levels of
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civic engagement to move from family to state, they miss the place of sub-
communities and social movements in shaping who youth may become
and how they may arrange their lives’ (Mayo, 2006a, p. 484). Here the
role that state-supported common schools might play is limited but still
significant. Common schools cannot simulate or emulate queer sub-
communities; nor can they adopt queer communal values as ‘constitutive’
of the school community. Doing so would violate liberal commitments to
inclusiveness and equal consideration. Nevertheless, common schools
might seek to find creative ways to foster links and interactions with queer
communities. Where possible, this might be done through field trips, guest
speakers and perhaps consultations with queer activists regarding the
inclusion of queer issues within the school curriculum. Where actual
interaction is impossible, due to geographical concerns for example,
virtual interaction is possible through web-based learning models. In any
case, children’s awareness of and familiarity with such communities will
be an important part of their education, especially as they make the
transition from family and school-based lives to lives of greater
independence from those institutions.
CONCLUSION: QUEER THEORY AND LIBERALISM—IS A CIVIL
UNION POSSIBLE?
In seeking to advance the aims of queer liberation, liberalism is often the
favoured target of queer critique. This is understandable and sometimes
appropriate, especially when the liberalism they challenge is that of liberal
realpolitik and of existing liberal educational practices and institutions.
Nevertheless, my general conclusion in this paper has been that liberal
principles of justice and their educational correlates need not stand in the
way of political and educational reforms that significantly accommodate
queer recognition in public schools. Moreover, I have tried to show that
liberal principles can help to advance the aims of queer recognition more
fully than is commonly acknowledged, by either liberal or queer theorists.
In particular, I have tried to illuminate some promising routes for
extending liberal recognition to queer children and queer communities
within public schools.
Nevertheless, it is also important to acknowledge that queer theory and
liberalism are to some extent at least embarked on divergent projects.
Liberalism is a political theory that seeks to define more clearly the limits
of state power over individual lives and seeks to clarify the sorts of
educational practices that an appropriately constrained state needs in order
to maintain its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens, and in order to uphold
justice within its borders. The constraints that the liberal state must respect
include, most importantly, those that arise from social facts of cultural and
moral diversity. And the educational practices needed for ensuring
legitimacy and justice in a liberal state are deeply shaped by these same
facts. Queer theory is not similarly constrained. It is, in part, a theoretical
manifestation of a social movement aimed primarily at advancing the
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interests of queer people. In doing so, it is, according to Mayo, ‘essentially
a movement that disrupts norms’; and queer theory may emphasise
and encourage these disruptions without necessarily paying much
attention to how liberal norms and values might be reinterpreted in light
of the new circumstances and considerations raised by queerness (Mayo,
2006a, p. 472).
The moral constraints constitutive of liberal politics place limits on the
extent to which the liberal state can influence the shaping of a child’s
identity. But they also must impose limits on the authority of cultural,
sexual, religious and other sub-communities to shape children’s moral
commitments and identity. Importantly, the best answers to the question of
what these limits should be are not permanently fixed (Feinberg and
McDonough, 2003, p. 9). The best answers will change, in part due to
changes in understandings about what sorts of identities and commitments
are compatible with liberal commitments of equal consideration, tolerance
and mutual respect among the morally diverse citizens who comprise
liberal societies. To that extent, liberal philosophers of education should
seek to respond to the ‘normative disruptions’ emphasised by queer
theory. Liberal philosophy of education should seek to clarify what the
best account of those limits is now, in present conditions; but it also seeks
to determine what prospects exist for maximising the individual autonomy
of all citizens when present social, legal and political conditions
illegitimately restrict it.
But the divergences between queer theory and liberalism should not be
overemphasised. Significantly, as Mayo herself indicates, queer theorists
and advocates are ‘often indebted to liberal theory for their general
normative commitments’ (Mayo, 2006a, p. 472). These debts may be
implicit or they may be explicitly acknowledged. But the project of
interpreting the limits of liberal norms and the project of advancing queer
interests are in any case unlikely to track each other perfectly. The task I
have been engaged with in this paper is to see if progress can be made in
understanding the extent to which broadly liberal political, moral and
educational commitments can be aligned more snugly with a wider, more
diverse set of social practices—in particular, practices that are congenial
to queer people and to the flourishing of queer children.
I do not know if the forms of educational recognition and accommoda-
tion I have recommended in this paper will be sufficiently robust to satisfy
the concerns of queer theorists and activists. If they are not, then it may be
that my arguments in this paper are wrong and queer theorists like Cris
Mayo are right when they argue that liberalism cannot adequately address
the educational concerns that queerness raises. But it may also be that
queer advocates, like advocates of all the various sub-communities within
liberal societies, need to adjust their expectations of what liberalism, as a
political theory, can be expected to accomplish in the name of any
particular group and its members. However that may be, my hope is that
the arguments and ideas in this paper will contribute to an ongoing
dialogue that will teach us how common schools might better serve the
interests of queer citizens.6
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1. Some more or less liberally minded educational theorists have addressed issues of teaching about
homosexuality as a controversial moral issue (Callan, 2000; Halstead and Lewicka, 1998; Reiss,
1997). However, issues of queer identity have not been discussed in any sustained way in the
recent voluminous literature on issues at the intersection of liberalism, cultural identity and
education. One notable exception is McKay (1998). Alexander McKay’s discussion draws heavily
on John Rawls in developing his arguments on sexuality education, but rather than treating
sexuality in terms of cultural and identity diversity, he treats these issues as centrally involving
ideological pluralism.
2. Thanks to Mark Halstead for helping me to clarify this point.
3. That is, a caver or speliologist.
4. The admittedly awkward label ‘able-normative’ is mine, not MacIntyre’s. I use it simply to
highlight the parallel with Mayo’s ‘heteronormative’.
5. The need for separate schools for queer students is surely regrettable, especially when it is an
emergency response to violence and bullying. But if such extreme measures are in some cases the
only feasible option, then public funding should at least be sufficient to provide an adequate
education. According to Dennis and Harlow, ‘The Harvey Milk School is essentially a one-room
schoolhouse, staffed only by one full-time and one half-time teacher. The New York City Board of
Education pays their salaries . . . but all other expenses of the school . . . must be paid for [by
private fund raising efforts]’ (Dennis and Harlow, 1986, p. 455).
6. Mark Halstead and Paul Standish were exceptionally gracious editors of this paper. Both of them
provided critical comments, late in the day, on an earlier draft. Without their help, for which I am
very grateful, I could not have finished this paper in time to have it included in this special issue
dedicated to Terry McLaughlin. I have also benefited a great deal from Liz Airton’s insights on
queer theory. It has been a delight to learn from her in our numerous conversations over the past
few months. Of course, I am solely responsible for any errors contained herein.
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